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Abstract

Cybersecurity risks threaten the digital economy,
including digital trade enabled by digital technologies.
As parts of cybersecurity capability building,
governments implement fragmented, in-flux policies to
manage cybersecurity threats from cross-border digital
activities. However, the lack of shared understandings
of cybersecurity within cross-border digital innovations
raises an increasing debate about how cybersecurity
capability building policies can impact digital trade
restrictions. This study develops a National Cyber
Trade Behavior model to examine the relationship
between national cybersecurity capability and digital
trade restrictions. Utilizing the PLS-SEM-based path
analysis, we draw empirical evidence to verify the
developed model and reveal that building cybersecurity
capability can indirectly support an open digital trade
system, mediated by E-government maturity.

1. Introduction
Our modern society is moving toward digital
society driven by transformational information
technology [17], including how trade happens and what
is being traded. Digital trade, loosely defined as
transactions of trade in goods and services which are
digitally ordered, enabled, or delivered [25], has become
a driving force of global digital economic growth.
Although digital trade is unlocking more business
opportunities, weak cybersecurity within digital
technology is becoming a growing threat [8, 18]. As
digital trade sits at the intersection of digitization and
trade, it is affected by governments’ increasing policies
to manage cybersecurity threats from digital trade.
Given the lack of standard rules of cybersecurity [22],
we can observe two different policy implementations
that can impact the cross-border digitization.
Some governments seek to implement policies to
restrict digital innovation to maintain political
stabilities, trust, personal and national cybersecurity,
and enforce the cyber-sovereignty. For instance, on May
15, 2019, the U.S. issued the “executive order on
securing the information and communications
technology and services supply chain,” declaring a
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national emergency to deal with the threats from
information and communication technologies (ICTs).
The U.S. Department of Commerce’s Bureau of
Industry and Security (BIS) then added Huawei
Technologies and its affiliates to the “Entity List,”
which bans U.S. firms doing business with Huawei.
On the other hand, some nations are also
implementing
cybercrime
legislation,
national
cybersecurity strategies (NCS), computer emergency
response teams (CERTs), etc. to improve their
capabilities to mitigate potential cyber threats and
ensure cyberspace resilience. For example, as one of the
first countries to create a cybersecurity strategy in 2008,
Estonia has invested significantly in cybersecurity. The
Estonian Information Security Association (EISA) was
founded in 2018 to further coordinate cybersecurity
commitments, including supporting the E.U. contractual
Public-Private-Partnership model on cybersecurity.
Though these two types of policy implementations
are not exclusive, some studies claimed that
governments implement digital trade restrictions in the
name of protecting critical infrastructure and national
security from cyber threats, but have little to do with
cybersecurity [14]. Others claim that these cybersecurity
rules can address national security issues, ensure
consumer privacy, and create a more secure digital
society [22, 36]. Due to the lack of understanding of
how cybersecurity and digital trade are connected, these
debates create significant uncertainty for the global
digital economy. Hence, this study aims to answer the
following question: how does the national cybersecurity
capability building impact digital trade restrictions?
By contextualizing the studies on security
behaviors [1] to the digital trade system, we consider
building cybersecurity capability as a national behavior
to increase the endogenous ability to mitigate cyber
threats, and implementing digital trade restrictions as a
national behavior to control and avoid cyber threats.
Furthermore, the policy diffusion theory [10] suggests
that the path dependency, internal actor, and external
actor can impact public policy adoption and diffusion,
which can apply to digital trade systems. As the egovernment maturity can increase transparency, public
access to information, and digital innovation adoption
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[21, 32], it can increase the governmental knowledge
about digitization and twist the implementation of
digital trade policies. Based on these propositions from
information systems, public policy, digital trade, and the
e-government discipline, this study develops a National
Cyber Trade Behavior model to analyze the impact of
national cybersecurity capability building on digital
trade restrictions.
Based on the empirical evidence from 46 countries
representing more than 80% of international trade in
services, this study reveals a significant negative impact
from national cybersecurity capability to the digital
trade restrictions, which is indirect and mediated by Egovernment maturity. In other words, the cybersecurity
capability building efforts which can improve the egovernment maturity can eventually reduce digital trade
restrictions. Otherwise, they may turn out as digital
trade restrictions. Instead of deterring the adoption of
digitization, cyber incidents can motivate investment in
cybersecurity, promote E-government maturity, and
foster a more open digital trade system.
These findings provide a tool for business leaders
and policymakers to manage cybersecurity threats
within digital trade systems. The developed model
suggests that a nation with high trade dependency, high
e-government maturity, and high cybersecurity
capability will have low digital trade restrictions. If the
cybersecurity policy can promote e-government
maturity, it has a high potential to reduce digital trade
restrictions. This mediation effect of e-government
maturity will support international business, especially
multinational enterprises, to evaluate the potential
cybersecurity policy risk in a specific international
market and align their global digital strategy to identify
opportunities and avoid costly surprises. It also suggests
that cybersecurity capability practices from those
nations with high e-government maturity can be more
practical to mitigate cybersecurity threats from digital
trade. Hence the international community should learn
from those practices to build applicable norms to
manage cyber threats within digital trade.

Many factors can influence individuals’ cognitive
reasoning,
such as costs/rewards, facilitating
conditions, formal/informal punishment, perceived
behavioral control, response efficacy, severity, shame,
subjective norms, susceptibility and violation
motivation, national culture, etc. Such reasoning will
drive individuals to take a problem-focused coping
action to protect themselves against cyber threats or
avoid adopting technologies to forbear the threats.
At the organizational level [6, 33], organizational
factors such as the support of top management and the
available internal resources, etc.; environmental factors
such as the peer pressure, the availability of the external
support resources and the national culture, etc.; and
technical factors including the relative advantage,
perceived complexity, compatibility, and trainability,
etc., collectively influence the organizational decision to
adopt new technologies. Whitman’s framework [34]
provides a holistic view of the policy development
lifecycle and has been widely adopted to develop and
implement organizational information security policies.
While these above studies have provided
revelatory insights about individual security behavior
and organizational adoption, the interaction between
different behaviors is somewhat overlooked. When we
consider security behavior at the national level, the
mechanism for national-level policies can be somewhat
different. A study revealing how nations balance the two
cybersecurity behaviors is needed. Additionally, the
current findings of the factors that influence behaviors,
such as the response efficacy, self-efficacy, perceived
costs, etc. are not always consistent from different
studies [15]. These inconsistent results warrant more
empirical studies and testing, especially when
considering security behaviors within a different
context: national cybersecurity behaviors for digital
trade. Furthermore, many existing studies focus on
compliance and non-compliance with information
security policy [23, 37]. The understanding of the
information security policy itself, especially within the
digital trade system, are limited.

2. Literature Review

2.2 Impacts of Digital Trade Restriction

2.1 Information Security Behaviors

Due to the increasing importance of digital trade to
economic growth, digital trade policy, innovation and
governance are relatively new but critical. Drawing
from case studies on health services, online advertising,
and uses of customer data for operational efficiency,
Goldfarb and Tucker revealed that privacy regulations

Many studies on individuals’ security behaviors [1,
23] 1 have made significant progress in understanding
the processes that motivate individuals to take protective
actions, seek help, or avoid different security threats.
1

A variety of theories, including deterrence theory, control theory,
institutional theory, protection motivation theory, theory of planned
behavior, emotional theory etc. have been developed to delve into
the behavioral aspects of individual security behaviors. Due to space

limitations, instead of acknowledging each paper, we refer to two
recent literature review articles that summarize the state-of-the-art of
studies on individual security behaviors.
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negatively impact innovative activities [9]. A few
empirical models are developed to quantify the effect of
restrictive policies on innovation and productivity. For
example, the Global Trade Analysis Project (GTAP)
model is used to estimate the negative economic impact
of the E.U. General Data Protection Regulation
(GDPR), concluding a loss of more than 300,000 jobs
and 1.3 percent of GDP due to trade reduction [20]. The
restrictive data policies tend to reduce the company’s
productivity across different industry sectors,
particularly those that are more data-intensive [7].
These studies mostly focus on the negative impact
of data restriction policies. However, digital trade is
much broader than just data flow [25]. Digital trade
restrictions also include policies like tariffs on digital
goods, filtering and blocking, Intellectual Property
Rights (IPR) infringement, national standards, and
burdensome conformity assessment and regulations to
limit disinformation and DDoS attacks [22]. The
implementation of these digital trade restrictions is also
unclear, making it difficult for organizations to
understand the global digitization environment. It is
critical to study the factors that impact the adoption of
such digital trade restrictions.

2.3 Policy Adoption and Diffusion
Policy diffusion theories have been developed to
understand how states/nations adopt new public policies
and the factors that influence policy adoption [10, 29,
30]. The Walker-Gray-Berry-and-Berry framework has
served as the cornerstone framework for studies on
policy diffusion: Walker conceptualized and tested the
policy diffusion in the U.S. states’ context, Gray
developed the now-standard S-curve pattern to
characterize policy adoption. The event history analysis
(EHA) was introduced by Berry and Berry to study
internal and regional influences on policy diffusion.
Recent work builds on these frameworks has continued
to analyze new features that impact policy diffusion,
including policy entrepreneurs, actions of the national
government, amendments to existing policies, the role
of political institutions and policy success, national
culture, and path dependence [10, 29].
Though policy diffusion patterns have been studied
in many different areas and contexts, most of these
studies focus on examining components of a single
policy, while few looks into multiple policies
simultaneously. The relationships between different
policies are also overlooked. In this study, we
distinguish the adoption of two different digital trade
policies: building cybersecurity capability or
implementing digital trade restrictions.

2.4 E-government Maturity Research
An increasing number of studies [2, 3, 13, 21, 24,
32] analyzed the e-government maturity model and the
factors that influence e-government adoption, including
technological, leadership, government, human, socialcultural, national culture, economic development,
political, geographical and demographic factors. For
example, information quality characteristics and
channel characteristics, both mediated and moderated
by transparency and trust, impact the citizens’ intentions
to use e-government services [3]. The public value of egovernment on increasing transparency, digital
innovation adoption, fostering an open, inclusive, and
responsive government, and corruption controlling are
widely discussed [32]. E-government maturity was
considered an important manifestation of anticorruption endeavors. The e-government can increase
government transparency, enable citizens’ participation
in public policy adoption, and reduce the costs of
transparency efforts, moderated by the national culture
and the economic development [24]. However, the egovernment’s impact on the digital trade policy
implementation is unclear, and more in-depth empirical
evidence is valuable.
Additionally, increasing digital connectivity is
creating cyber-attack vectors for attackers. Cyber
incidents targeting governments are making headlines
globally, including Bulgaria, India, Singapore, and the
United States, to name just a few. It is necessary to
understand whether these increasing cyber threats will
deter E-government adoption and turn the government
to develop more restrictive digital trade policies.

3 Conceptual Model
As shown in Figure 1, in our conceptualization of
the national cyber trade behavior model, we distinguish
two main behaviors to handle cybersecurity issues
within digital trade: building national cybersecurity
capability to cope with cyber threats, named building
cybersecurity capability, and implementing digital trade
restrictions to avoid cyber threats through digital trade,
named implementing digital restriction.

Figure 1. National cyber trade behavior model*
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*We

number the hypotheses from right bottom to left top to make it easier to digest the
model.

From a resource-based view, available resources
and knowledge about potential threats shape the
decision making and the performance of the outcome
[24]. Within the digital trade context, the government’s
digitization knowledge and capability can impact their
behaviors in the digital trade policies implementation.
More specifically, governments with better digitization
capabilities will better understand digital trading,
including cyber threats through digital trade. As the
digital products and services to promote E-government
maturity, including both software and hardware, rely
heavily on global supply chains [4]. In contrast,
restrictive digital trade policies will limit the capability
to access necessary international resources and increase
e-government development costs. Nations with higher
E-government maturity intend to avoid restrictive
digital trade policies. On the other hand, e-government
development can increase government transparency and
openness [2], driving a more open digital trade system.
Therefore, we hypothesize the following:
Hypothesis 1: There is a negative relation between Egovernment maturity and digital trade restriction.
Path dependency [26] has been widely studied in
public policy diffusion studies to explain the impact of
institutional history on policy change, as the preceding
situations will shape the meaning, purpose, and
direction of future actions. In the context of digital trade,
though there exist differences between digital trade and
traditional trade in services, the way a nation manages
the general trade in services can shape the
implementation of digital trade policies. Therefore,
Hypothesis 2: There is a positive relation between
general service trade restriction and digital trade
restriction.
As discussed above, the restrictions on international
trade, especially the trade in services, can limit the
government’s capability to utilize global digital
innovations and resources, consequently impacting its
e-government development. International trade in
services [35] includes business and professional
services like computer and related services,
communication services like audiovisual services and
telecommunications, educational services, health, and
social services, all of which are essential components for
e-government development. Hence, we hypothesize:
Hypothesis 3: There is a negative relation between the
general service trade restriction and E-government
maturity.
Many debates exist regarding trade protectionism
and liberalism, as protectionism and free trade both have

benefits and costs for economic growth [5, 31]. For a
nation that highly depends on international trade,
building restrictions on trade will reduce its
international trade and consequently harm its economic
growth, at least in the short term. Hence, restrictive trade
policies can be costlier for a nation whose economy is
built on international trade. The increased cost of trade
restrictions will prevent the adoption of restrictive
policies [1]. Therefore:
Hypothesis 4: There is a negative relation between
national trade dependence and digital trade restriction.
Hypothesis 5: There is a negative relation between
national trade dependence and general service trade
restriction.
The perceived threat is a critical component in
motivating the coping behaviors that avert potential
harm [1]. It represents the extent to which a particular
event is perceived as dangerous or harmful, reflecting
the objective’s assessment of their susceptibility to the
threat and of perceived severity of the danger. Recently
we have observed increasing cyberattacks targeting
government information systems, such as the
ransomware attack on the U.S. government in Baltimore
City, the Wannacry cyber attack on the U.K.’s National
Health Service (NHS). Such attacks may increase
concerns about the potential threat and immature Egovernment, deterring governments from adopting such
digital technology. Hence, we hypothesize:
Hypothesis 6: There is a negative relation between
experienced cyber incidents and E-government
maturity.
The coping capability, defined as the capability to
mitigate the perceived threat, is another primary
cognitive process used in various security behavior
theories like protection motivation theory (PMT) and
technology threat avoidance theory (TTAT) [23].
Previous studies demonstrate that the perceived coping
abilities, including the response efficacy and selfefficacy, can motivate individuals to take protective
actions and reduce the intention to avoid using digital
technologies. Hence, if the government can manage
potential cyber threats, they will have a positive attitude
towards adopting, instead of avoiding, e-government.
Thus, we hypothesize the following:
Hypothesis 7: There is a positive relation between
national cybersecurity capability and E-government
maturity.
Cyber-attacking is considered as a tactical tool
within a state’s arsenal of power, popular for politicians,
policymakers, and defense contractors. States and nonstate actors can use cyber-attacking as a foreign policy
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tool, as a means to “impact, change, or modify
diplomatic and military interactions between entities”
[19]. However, there is still a lack of empirical evidence
to demonstrate that cyber operations can shift the
targeted states’ foreign policy. The impact of the cyber
attacks can be limited [16]. Instead, the targeted
governments will improve their cyber capabilities to
manage potential further cyber threats. For example,
after Russia infiltrated Estonia in 2007, Estonia began
to develop its national cyber strategy in 2008. Thus:
Hypothesis 8: There is a positive relation between
experienced cyber incidents and national cybersecurity
capability.
The economic development has also been viewed
as an essential factor for e-government adoption [24].
Countries with greater economic capacity are better
poised to accomplish e-government actions and invest
in cybersecurity capability building. Thus, we
hypothesize the following:
Hypothesis 9: There is a positive relation between
economic development level and national cybersecurity
capability.
Hypothesis 10: There is a positive relation between
economic development level and E-government
maturity.
Empirical studies confirm that comparative
advantages across countries can partially explain
international trade, and economic development will
impact a country’s comparative advantages in
international trade [12]. Therefore, we can expect that a
nation with a higher economic development level will
have a higher dependency on international trade.
Hypothesis 11: There is a positive relation between
economic development level and trade dependency.

4. Data and Research Methodology
4.1 Data
To verify the developed conceptual national cyber
trade behavior model, we create a dataset of indicators
from different sources.
The general trade restriction on services, and the
digital trade restriction, are derived from the OECD
trade restrictiveness index database. OECD launched a
project in 2014 aimed at providing an objective
overview of service trade restrictions. Based on the
investigation of more than 16,000 laws and regulations
from 22 sectors in 46 countries, the OECD Service
Trade Restrictiveness Index database (STRI) offers an
unprecedented depth of information, covering nearly

400 different policy measures. The OECD Digital
Service Trade Restrictiveness Index (D-STRI) is further
developed to capture the impediments that specifically
affect digital trade, including the infrastructure and
connectivity, electronic transactions, payment systems,
intellectual property rights, and other barriers affecting
trade in digitally-enabled services such as online
advertising, encryption and technology transfers.
The national trade dependency is from the World
Bank Trade index. This study uses Trade (% of GDP),
the sum of exports and imports of goods and services
measured as a share of gross domestic product (GDP),
to quantify the importance of international trade for a
given nation. The World Bank’s PPP GNI per capita,
which refers to the gross national income (GNI)
converted to international dollars using purchasing
power parity rates, has been widely used to evaluate
each nation’s economic development level. In this
study, we use the log values of PPP GNI per capita to
represent economic capacity.
E-government maturity captures each nation’s
maturity of e-government services and digitization
capability. Since 2003, the United Nations Department
of Economic and Social Affairs has conducted surveys
every two years on its member states' e-government
development. The e-government development index,
EGDI, is considered as the widely adopted indicator for
e-government maturity.
We use the Global Cybersecurity Index (GCI)
published by the International Telecommunication
Union (ITU) for the national cybersecurity capability.
The GCI reference assesses cybersecurity commitments
across five pillars (legal, technical, organizational,
capacity building, and cooperation) based on 25 subindicators. An overall GCI score is generated to evaluate
each government’s cybersecurity capability.
To quantify the cyber threats for each nation, we
use events from the Council on Foreign Relations’
Cyber Operations Tracker (https://www.cfr.org/
interactive/cyber-operations), which lists all publicly
known instances of significant and state-sponsored
cyberattacks since 2005. This study then calculates the
experienced cyber incidents index as the aggregate
number of incidents that had occurred for each country
up through the specified year.

4.2 Descriptive Statistics
Table 1 reports the descriptive statistics for each
variable within our dataset. In this study, we use the
2017 data for analysis. We make this decision because
GCI data in 2016 is not available, and trade dependency
data for JPN, USA, ISR, and NZL, and GNI data for
ISL, LVA, and LTU in 2018 is not available when we
conducted this study. The Shapiro-Wilk test shows a
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significant w-score for all variables expect GCI, which
indicates that the datasets we are handling are
significant, non-normal. Thus PLS-SEM analysis
technology is a suitable method for this study.
Table 1: Summary Statistics
Std.
WVariable
Obs
Mean
Min
Max
Dev
score
Digital Trade
Restriction
46
0.178
0.043
0.488
0.097
0.874***
(D_STRI)
General
Service Trade
45##
0.262
0.137
0.491
0.080
0.901**
Restriction
(STRI)
Trade
Dependency
46
92.709
24.144
412.869
67.059
0.760***
(TRD)
Economic
Development
46
4.530
3.851
4.883
0.226
0.935*
(GNI)
E-government
Maturity
46
0.766
0.487
0.910
0.100
0.942*
(EGDI) #
Cybersecurity
Capability
46
0.634
0.336
0.919
0.145
0.966
(GCI)
Experienced
Cyber
46
10.429
1.000
88.000
14.691
0.592***
Incidents (CC)
#: EGDI is available bi-yearly. We use the average between EDGI_2016 and EDGI_2018 to
calculate the EGDI_2017.
##: The STRI data for ARG is not available to include ARG in this study, resulting in 45
nations in this study. We will use the Pairwise Deletion strategy, which only deletes those
cases that exhibit missing values in each pair of variables.
*** p<0.001 ** p<0.01 * p<0.05 ‡ p<0.1

4.3 Research Method
Partial least squares structural equation modeling
(PLS-SEM) is considered as a powerful method for path
analysis in many disciplines, including strategic
management, marketing, accounting, operations
management, and human resource management, etc.
[11, 27, 28]. Specifically, PLS-SEM is more suitable
when the study (1) focuses on understanding the nature
of relationships as opposed to the magnitude of those
relationships, (2) uses single-item constructs as PLS
allows for “unrestricted use of single-item constructs”
and (3) involves non-normal data. As we are developing
a new national cyber trade behavior model to investigate
relationships among digital trading, E-government
maturity, and cybersecurity capability, PLS-SEM is the
most suitable analysis approach. This study used
SmartPLS 3.0 to implement the PLS-SEM method and
analyze the dataset.

5. Result
5.1 Assessment of the Structural Model
To evaluate the construct measures' reliability and
validity in the developed model, we investigate the
composite reliability indicators, including Cronbach’s
Alpha, rbo_A, and average variance extracted (AVE),
which are all 1.000. The Discriminant Validity based on

the Fornell-Larcker test shows that the AVE's square
root exceeds all correlations between each factor and
every other construct. Hence, the developed model
contains strong psychometric properties.
To enhance confidence in the PLS-SEM results, we
apply bootstrapping to determine the level of
significance. We also conduct the Stone-Geisser test
using blindfolding to evaluate the developed path
model's cross-validated predictive relevance. Finally,
we use the PLSpredict procedure to assess the model’s
out-of-sample predictive power.
Table 2 Structural Model Assessment
Key Variable

R2
Adjusted
##

Q2

PLS
RMS
E

LM
MAE

RMSE

MAE

Cybersecurity
0.253**
0.23
Capability
0.133
0.105
0.541
0.510
(0.103)
4
(GCI)
E-government
0.777***
0.69
Maturity
0.068
0.051
0.882
0.877
(0.064)
6
(EGDI)
Digital Trade
0.484***
0.43
Restriction
0.082
0.062
1.452
1.448
(0.109)
9
(D_STRI)
General
Service Trade
0.087
0.11
0.087
0.064
1.070
1.062
Restriction
(0.061)
0
(STRI)
Trade
0.142*
0.15
64.943
46.453
483.760
470.934
Dependency
(0.074)
0
(TRD)
##: The standard deviation is reported in parentheses; *** p<0.001 ** p<0.01 * p<0.05

As reported in Table 2, the VIF values are all lower
than 3, eliminating collinearity as an issue for this study.
The 𝑅𝑅2 values for the key variables: cybersecurity
capability, E-government maturity, and digital trade
restriction are all significant, indicating a sufficient
explanatory power of the developed model. The 𝑄𝑄2
values are all larger than zero, indicating good
predictive accuracy. Using the 10-fold cross-validation
setting in PLSpredict, the results show that comparing
with the naïve LM (linear regression model) benchmark,
and the RMSE (root mean squared error) and MAE
(mean absolute error) in the PLS-SEM analysis are both
significantly lower. Therefore, the developed structural
model has high predictive power and is satisfactory.

5.2 Hypothesis Assessment
Figure 2 reports the path analysis result. We can see
that the developed hypotheses, except the impact of the
general restriction on digital restriction (H2), and the
impact of cyber threats on governmental digitization
(H6), are significantly supported. It is worth noting that
the general service trade restriction does have a positive,
though not significant, direct impact on the digital trade
restriction adoption (H2). The experienced cyber
incidents have a positive, though not significant, direct
effect on E-government maturity (H6). Hence, the
previous cyber incidents do not deter nations from egovernment adoption.

Page 4357

cyber incidents do push governments to invest in
cybersecurity. Interestingly, the cyber incidents
themselves do not significantly impact either the egovernment maturity or the digital trade restriction.

5.3 Mediation Effect

Figure 2. Path Coefficients Result
Table 3 summarizes the direct, indirect, and total
effect for the predictors on the key outcome variables:
digital trade restriction, E-government maturity, and
cybersecurity capability. E-government maturity, trade
dependency, economic development, and cybersecurity
capability all significantly impact digital trade
restriction. Though the direct impact of general service
trade restriction on digital trade restriction is not
significant, we observe a significant indirect effect,
resulting in a significant, overall positive impact. The
path dependence effect from general trade in service to
digital trade does exist.
The trade dependency, economic development, and
cybersecurity capability all have significant positive
impacts on E-government maturity. The general service
trade restriction has a significant negative effect on Egovernment maturity, indicating that trade restrictions
limit a government’s capability to promote its egovernment maturity.
The economic capability significantly supports the
cybersecurity capability building, and the experienced

To evaluate the mediation effect from Egovernment maturity and cybersecurity capability, we
further report the specific indirect effects in Table 4. It
shows that the E-government maturity has a significant
indirect-only mediation impact on the effect from
cybersecurity capability, economic development, and
general trade service restriction to digital trade
restriction. This confirms the critical role of Egovernment maturity for the digital trade system.
For effect of experienced cyber incidents on Egovernment maturity, the cybersecurity capability
shows a significant, positive, indirect-only mediation
impact. Cyber capability also has a significant, partial
mediation effect on the impact of economic
development on E-government maturity. This indicates
that cybersecurity capability can turn the economic
ability and experienced cyber incidents into motivations
to promote E-government maturity.
Cybersecurity capability and E-government
maturity together show a negative mediation effect for
the impact of cyber incidents on digital trade restriction.
Hence, rather than deterring a society from digitization,
previous cyber incidents can push cybersecurity
capability building, increase E-government maturity,
and finally motivate less digital trade restrictions.

Table 3 Results of PLS-SEM path analysis
Outcome

Digital Trade
Restriction
(D_STRI)

Predictor

Direct Effect

E-government maturity

-0.440** (0.147)

Trade Dependency

-0.263**(0.083)

Cybersecurity
Capability (GCI)

Total Effect
-0.440** (0.147)

-0.117*(0.054)

-0.380***(0.071)

Economic Development

-0.454***(0.110)

-0.454***(0.110)

Cybersecurity Capability

-0.129*(0.060)

-0.129*(0.060)

0.115 (0.066)

0.361**(0.131)

Experienced Cyber Incidents

-0.054(0.046)

-0.054(0.046)

Trade Dependency

0.084 (0.044)

0.084‡(0.044)

0.145*(0.057)

0.718***(0.063)

General Service Trade Restriction

E-government
Maturity (EGDI)

Indirect Effect

0.247(0.158)

‡

‡

Economic Development

0.573***(0.101)

Cybersecurity Capability

0.293**(0.093)

General Service Trade Restriction

-0.260*(0.110)

Experienced Cyber Incidents

0.017(0.098)

Economic Development

0.379***(0.106)

0.379***(0.106)

Experienced Cyber Incidents

0.363***(0.088)

0.363***(0.088)

0.293**(0.093)
-0.260*(0.110)
0.107**(0.041)

0.124(0.088)

The standard deviation is reported in parentheses; *** p<0.001 ** p<0.01 * p<0.05 ‡ p<0.1
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Table 4 The Mediation Effect of Cybersecurity Capability and Governmental Digitization
Specific Indirect Effects

Mediatio
n Effect

Point
Estimate

Mediation Effect from E-government maturity
Cybersecurity Capability -> E-government maturity ->
Indirect-0.129*
Digital Trade Restriction
only
(0.060)
Experienced Cyber Incidents -> E-government maturity
-0.008
NO
-> Digital Restriction
(0.047)
Economic Development -> E-government maturity ->
Indirect-0.252**
Digital Trade Restriction
only
(0.095)
General Restriction -> E-government maturity -> Digital
Indirect0.115‡
Trade Restriction
only
(0.066)
Mediation Effect from Cybersecurity Capability
Experienced Cyber Incidents -> Cybersecurity Capability
Indirect0.107**
-> E-government maturity
Only
(0.041)
Economic Development -> Cybersecurity Capability -> E0.111*
Partial
government maturity
(0.052)
Mediation Effect from Cybersecurity Capability and E-government maturity
Experienced Cyber Incidents -> Cybersecurity Capability
Indirect-0.047‡
-> E-government maturity -> Digital Trade Restriction
Only
(0.025)
Economic Development -> Cybersecurity Capability -> EIndirect-0.049‡
government maturity -> Digital Trade Restriction
Only
(0.029)
The standard deviation is reported in parentheses; *** p<0.001 ** p<0.01 * p<0.05 ‡ p<0.1

6 Conclusion and Discussion
6.1 Theoretical implications
This study sought to investigate the relationships
between cybersecurity commitment and digital trade
restrictions. The evidence from 46 countries show that
there exists no significant direct impact from
cybersecurity capability building to digital trade
restriction, but indirect impact mediated by Egovernment maturity. If the policy for cybersecurity
capability building can promote e-government
maturity, it can eventually motivate a less restrictive
digital trade system. However, the cybersecurity
capability building practices that counteract the egovernment adoption may result in a more stringent
digital trade system. This elaborates on the debates
about the impact of cybersecurity on digital trade
restriction, satisfying our original objective.
Secondly, our work contextualizes information
security behavior theories into the national policy
adoption
context
by
considering
building
cybersecurity capability as taking a protective action,
and implementing digital restriction as an avoidance
action. This study empirically shows that the
perceived cyber threat can motivate the protective
action by building cybersecurity capability within the
context of digital trade policy. This observation is
consistent with many studies on individual and
organizational behaviors [1, 23]. However, there is no
significant direct relationship between the experienced
cyber incidents and the e-government maturity or
digital trade restriction. Hence, unlike individual

Bootstrapping
Percentile BC 95% CI
Bca 95% CI
Lower
Upper
Lower
Upper
-0.256

-0.040

-0.253

-0.050

-0.099

0.046

-0.102

0.047

-0.406

-0.104

-0.407

-0.098

0.030

0.243

0.029

0.243

0.053

0.189

0.052

0.186

0.044

0.210

0.047

0.215

-0.104

-0.017

-0.101

-0.016

-0.117

-0.015

-0.114

-0.015

security behavior, the perceived cyber threat will not
trigger avoidance behavior for nations. Conversely,
mediated by the cybersecurity capability building,
cyber incidents can motivate governments to invest in
cybersecurity, improve e-government maturity, and
eventually foster a more open digital trade system.
This study confirms the value of extending the
behavioral and organizational studies of cybersecurity
to the public policy and highlighting the differences
within the national level policies context.
This study's third contribution is to extend the
previous research scope for e-government studies [32].
Our study reveals the critical role of e-government
maturity for a more secure, open digital trade system.
A mature E-government system can encourage less
restrictive digital trade policies and mediate the impact
from cybersecurity capability building, economic
development, and general service trade restrictions to
digital trade restrictions. Additionally, a growing body
of literature has discussed the driving factors for egovernment adoption, including national culture,
economic development, political, information quality,
trust and transparency, geographical and demographic
factors [3]. Beyond these factors, this study further
confirms that access to global resources through
international trade and the capability to handle cyber
threats by cybersecurity capability building can
significantly impact the E-government maturity.
6.2 Practical implications
While digital trade is unlocking more global
business opportunities, governments' in-flux digital
trade policies to manage cyber threats are creating
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significant political risks for business. Organizations
need to understand these policies to align their global
digital strategy. This study suggests that a nation with
high trade dependency, high cybersecurity
commitment, advantaged e-government maturity, and
low general trade restrictions would have low digital
trade restrictions. More specifically, if the
implementation of a cybersecurity capability building
policy cannot promote e-government maturity, such a
policy may turn out as a digital trade barrier. For
example, our data shows that Indonesia has the lowest
e-government maturity, low trade dependency, low
cybersecurity capability, and a restrictive trade
environment. Business leaders should prepare for a
restrictive digital trade environment when entering
Indonesia’s digital market. However, given the
significant increase in cybersecurity capability and egovernment maturity, we can expect that Indonesia's
digital trade environment will become less restrictive,
which opens new business opportunities. Hence, the
developed framework can serve as a baseline for
business leaders to evaluate the consequences of
increasing cybersecurity policies and understand the
trend of digital trade environments, which can help
them effectively design their global digital strategy.
On the other hand, the international community
needs to develop a cyber-secure digital trade system
that can simultaneously defend against growing cyber
threats through digital trade and support the global
digital innovations. This study reveals the mediation
effect of E-government maturity on the impact from
cybersecurity capability building to digital trade
restrictions. Hence, when implementing the
cybersecurity capability building policy, governments
should avoid those practices that can hinder the
promotion of E-government maturity. Additionally,
the practices from those nations with high
cybersecurity capability building, high e-government
maturity, and low digital trade restrictions can provide
useful insights to develop practical guidance to
manage cybersecurity issues within the digital trade
system effectively. Hence, given the significant
commitment to cybersecurity, the best digital
governmental capabilities, and the national strategy to
build the global digital supply chain hub, Singapore is
best positioned to coordinate the cybersecurity
governance framework for the digital trade system.
6.3 Limitations and Future Research
Like all studies, this empirical analysis has its
limitations, and some of them open up opportunities
for future work. First, only 46 countries from the
OECD Digital Service Trade Restrictiveness Index
have the required data for this study. However, these

46 countries represent over 80% of international trade
in services. Hence, this study's conclusion is
representative enough to describe the relationships
between cybersecurity commitment, e-government
maturity, and digital trade restriction. Additionally,
this study employs the PLS-SEM based path analysis
method, which can handle small sample sizes.
We acknowledge that the unobserved countries
have significantly different economic development
levels, e-government maturities, trade dependencies,
and cybersecurity commitments. Once their digital
trade restriction data is available, further studies to
generalize the developed theory will be valuable.
The study does not consider other possible
factors, such as political capacity and national culture.
Including more diverse interactions could help in
investigating the cross-country effects. Future studies
should explore additional variables, especially those
related to cross-country effects, to construct a more
refined picture of national cyber trade behaviors.
In this study, all factors are measured through
single items, which could be viewed as a limitation.
However, many previous researchers have argued that
“the single-item measures can provide an acceptable
balance between practical needs and psychometric
concerns” [28] and that these single-item measures can
be high in validity. PLS-SEM is a suitable method
when a study uses single-item constructs, as PLS-SEM
allows for the unrestricted use of single-item
constructs [11]. However, further studies that include
more than one item for each factor are valuable to
increase the results' validity.
Given the data availability, this study does not
consider the developed theory's evolution. Future
research should look into this model's dynamic, such
as further analysis when data from subsequent years is
released. More empirical studies to reveal trigger
factors for such evolution will be precious.
Finally, this study provides the first step towards
a governance framework to manage the increasing
cybersecurity concerns within the digital trade system.
Further studies to identify the norms from practices to
guide business leaders and policymakers' decisionmaking are also critical.
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